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Goal:  flexible and adaptable enterprises
• Changing nature of competition
• Increased uncertainty
• Increased interdependence between users,
partners, suppliers, other stakeholders
• Increased technical complexity and
interdependence between enterprises and
technical systems
• Commercial and military contexts
Motivation
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Concept:
Network-Centric Warfare
Self-Synchronization… organize and synchronize
complex…activities from the bottom up...principles are unity
of e!ort, clearly articulated commander's intent, and carefully
crafted rules of engagement*
*Cebrowski, Garstka, 1998
It overcomes the loss of combat power inherent in top-down
mand directed synchronization characte istic of more
conventional doctrine and converts combat from a step function
to a high-speed continuum.*
This calls for a different
enterprise architecture…
… in operations and
acquisition
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The Basic Idea
• Classic hierarchical tree structure as the foundation
– Two basic modifications to create all varieties of structures
• vertical connections
• lateral connections (within layers)
• Hypothesis:  enterprises with more lateral vs. vertical
connections will perform better in complex, dynamic and
uncertain environments, both operational and acquisition
8 paths from top to bottom
14 lateral connections added
256 paths top to bottom
34 vertical connections added;
48 paths top to bottom
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Approach
• If we examine architectures of operational
military enterprises, we may be able to
identify features that
– correspond to desired attributes
– provide insights into mechanisms that drive
enterprise architectures, such as:
• Key stakeholder dynamics
• Doctrines
• Cultures
• Other external factors
– impact and are impacted by technical system
architectures and social architectures
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Combat Air Operations
1991-2003
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1991:  Desert Storm
CAOC/TACC
CAOC/TACC
CENTCOM
CONUS
SUPPORT
FIELDED FORCES
2003:  Iraqi Freedom
CAOC ARMY
CENTCOMHQ/CONUS
FIELDED FORCES
NCA/SECDEF/CENTCOM
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Measuring the Architecture
• Ratio of lateral to vertical connections
• Number of paths through the system
expresses as a ratio to the number of nodes
(paths/node)
• Spectral and other network theoretic
measures (in progress)
• n.b.:  numbers that follow are preliminary
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Initial Attempt at Measurement
Note: preliminary data
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Insights/Observations
• Doctrinal organization was never used
– Different organization in each case
– IT enables more choices, more options
• No significant structural change in air operations C2
enterprise since Desert Storm
– No transformation yet--at the operational level of enterprise
• Possible reasons
– Externally imposed constraints (risk management)
– Doctrinal assumptions about proper use and effectiveness
of coercive force--inter-service tussle
– Other forces driving acquisition programs
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Insights/Observations
• Architectural measures:
– V/L ratio may prove a good proxy measure for flexibility of an
enterprise architecture, more work is necessary
• Possible that transformational change (and effects) are
concentrated at the tactical level
– The core proposition of NCW
– Enabled by changed tactical rules (not operational level
architecture)
• Potential emergence of a formal coordinating (integrating) layer
between service components and Joint Force Commander
• Underappreciated:
– Role of key actors/leaders
– Potential for manipulation of enterprise architecture and the
strategic agenda of the enterprise--even in a military context
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Methodological and
Analytical Challenges
• Abstraction and modeling may be a more effective
than detailed, microscopic, analysis
• Modeling at a larger scale
– Examination of architecture may be more informative than
micro-level analysis
– Properties of interest to senior leadership are here
– Architecture places ‘boundaries’ or ‘constraints’ on
potential enterprise dynamics, properties, actions at the
micro-level
• Catch-22:  macro-level modeling and analysis must
be supported by a robust micro-level theory
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Potential Benefits
• A tool to ‘measure’ progress toward transformation
• Deeper understanding of fundamental dynamics,
mechanisms and driving forces in enterprise
transformation
– Highlight areas where management, senior executive
attention have most impact
• Concepts and tools to enable design of flexible and
adaptable enterprise-technical systems
– Impact of organizational modularity on performance (Army)
– Flexibility of programs to changing user requirements (spiral
development)
– Coordination boards
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Operationalization
(a larger agenda)
• Design:
– Bi-directional causality between capability and structure
– What are the limitations of lateral vs. vertical architectures?
– When, where, do different architectures perform ‘better’?
– How do/can we design enterprises to preferentially grow lateral
connections?
• Management:
– Understanding conscious and unconscious forces that drive
evolution of enterprise capabilities
• For the specific case of combat air operations:
–  Is there an upper limit on what the CAOC can ‘command’?
• For military operations in general:  What architectures enable
truly effective capability generation--not just maximization of air
power’s effectiveness and efficiency?
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Questions
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Methodological and
Analytical Challenge
“While on the Gulf War Air Power Survey, I started trying to count the
informal and lateral links between people and  organizations in
theater and between theater and CONUS.  I gave up because it was
very difficult to count and the number was very high…very difficult to
trace…these connections saved the formal organization … from
collapse by providing timely information, analysis, and instructions.”
--Dr. Mark D. Mandeles
C2 Analyst, Gulf War Air Power Survey
